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Central bank governance and financial stability: 




The recent global financial crisis has raised new questions about the role of central banks in 
maintaining financial stability. How would such a role influence the governance of central 
banks? Given the difficulty of even defining financial stability, much work remains to be done 
in designing effective central bank structures for making financial stability operational. This 
note discusses the main challenges and considers issues that could be of particular 
relevance to Africa.  
2.  Reform of financial stability arrangements 
There is broad agreement that prudential policy should have a macroprudential dimension if 
it is to ensure financial stability. The idea is to look beyond the risk position of individual 
institutions to risks affecting the system as a whole. There are many reasons why such risks 
are not simply an aggregation of individual risks. One is externalities: interconnections 
among financial intermediaries and among markets create common exposures that could 
threaten the whole system (contagion). Another reason is network effects, in which the failure 
of even a small institution could trigger a cascading effect through the whole system. 
Common exposures or uniform responses to shocks could magnify such effects. A third 
reason is procyclicality, which refers to the tendency of the financial system to amplify 
macroeconomic or global financial shocks.  
In a number of countries, the debate on how best to remedy deficiencies in existing financial 
stability arrangements has been intense over the past few years, with competing proposals 
being offered by existing agencies with a direct or indirect mandate for financial stability as 
well as by the financial industry, elected officials and academia. The focus of the debate has 
been on how to ensure a smoother functioning of the financial system and avoid further 
episodes of widespread financial distress. Although reform proposals span a variety of 
arrangements (discussed below), there is broad agreement that the development of a 
macroprudential policy framework will constitute an essential element in ensuring financial 
stability and that central banks will play a key role in that process.  
Central banks are well placed to assume greater responsibilities for macroprudential 
oversight:  
  The conduct of monetary policy provides central banks with a macroeconomic focus 
and an understanding of linkages among financial markets, institutions and 
infrastructures. This gives them a comparative advantage in the exercise of a 
macroprudential function.  
                                                  
1    The author wishes to thank David Archer, Anne Mackenzie, Dubravko Mihaljek and Philip Turner for 
comments, and Emir Emiray and Emese Kuruc for research assistance.  22  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
  They have an inherent interest in preventing financial instability given that it can 
affect economic activity, price stability and the monetary transmission mechanism.  
  They are the ultimate source of liquidity (bank reserves) for the economy, and 
appropriate liquidity provision is crucial to financial stability.  
In some countries, central banks are also being given a more prominent role in 
microprudential supervision. In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve is now 
the microprudential supervisor for all systemically important firms (including non-banks). In 
the United Kingdom, a number of supervisory responsibilities of the existing microprudential 
supervisor, the Financial Services Authority, will be transferred to the Bank of England in 
2012.  
The rationale for such an enhanced role for central banks in both macro- and microprudential 
oversight is that there are synergies between the two functions. Such synergies relate to:   
  Cross-fertilisation: microprudential policy is improved by access to information about 
macroeconomic and financial conditions and about the interconnections between 
institutions; and macroprudential policy is improved by access to information on the 
risks faced by individual institutions. 
  Reliance on information from the macro- and microprudential policy functions for 
lender of last resort intervention.  
  The need for a close coordination of macroprudential and monetary policies in view 
of the importance of information on the dynamic behaviour of the financial system 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy and vice versa (Mishkin (2011)).  
Putting both monetary and prudential functions under the central bank’s roof has a number of 
advantages: direct access to information on institutions; more thorough monitoring of 
markets and the macroeconomy; and faster decision-making. Yet, developing a 
macroprudential perspective while not losing sight of the key monetary policy function is not 
an easy task.  
3.  Issues raised by the reform of financial stability arrangements 
Many central bankers regard the maintenance of financial stability as an entirely normal part 
of their existing policy responsibilities. Even so, it does create some hard choices.  
i.  Difficulty of specifying mandate and policy instruments 
An immediate concern relates to the difficulty of specifying the central bank’s mandate in the 
area of financial stability. Survey evidence shows that an overwhelming majority of central 
banks consider that they have full or shared responsibility for financial stability oversight and 
policy (BIS (2009)), but their mandates are rarely explicit because the concept is difficult to 
define. In about one third of central bank laws, a financial stability objective is not mentioned 
at all (Graph 1). In many other cases, it is mentioned in connection with a microprudential 
task, such as supervising financial institutions, ensuring the safe functioning of key 
components of the financial infrastructure (payment and settlement systems, in particular) or, 
exceptionally, intervening as lender of last resort. Where they exist at all, financial stability 
objectives are often more vague than monetary policy objectives. Price stability can be 




Financial stability objectives in central bank laws 






For all the central bank’s tasks For a named subset 
of the central bank’s tasks
No objective specified
Financial objectives for overall financial system
Financial objectives for part of the financial system
Note: Based on review of 97 central bank laws and statues. 
Source: BIS. 
A major concern of the report of a study group headed by Stefan Ingves, Governor of 
Sveriges Riksbank (hereafter referred to as the Ingves Report), was that a poorly defined 
mandate creates significant challenges. An immediate challenge is that without a reasonably 
precise mandate, policymakers cannot know which actions are desired of them and which 
are not. Another is that the lack of a clear mandate prevents policymakers from being able to 
understand society’s priorities when circumstances call for actions that conflict with other 
elements of policy. Yet another is that policymakers might not be held accountable for 
actions for which they should be accountable, and they might be held accountable for goals 
for which they are neither clearly responsible nor equipped to achieve. And the lack of a clear 
mandate makes it nearly impossible for the public to be able to predict the direction of policy 
actions under different scenarios, creating the risk of a mismatch between the central bank’s 
intentions and the public’s expectations.  
Moreover, macroprudential policy does not yet encompass a dedicated set of policy 
instruments. Until recently, the conventional wisdom was that if monetary policies ensured 
price stability over a sufficiently long time horizon, then financial stability would be ensured 
over an even longer time horizon. In fact, financial stability was treated as almost a 
by-product of monetary stability. This is no longer thought to be the case. It is now accepted 
that such a narrow focus on price stability might on occasion create, or exacerbate, financial 
imbalances that lead to sharp and destabilising corrections.  
Given that monetary policy settings are not sufficient to ensure the twin objectives of 
monetary and financial stability, additional tools are required to help ensure financial stability. 
The central bank’s lender of last resort function during a crisis is clearly one such tool, but 
instruments that do not have macro stability as their primary purpose may nonetheless serve 
a preventive objective. For example, many supervisory regulations designed for the “micro” 
purpose of preserving the soundness of individual banks or their borrowers could also serve 
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1  Capital and other balance sheet requirements also apply to insurers and pension funds, but we restrict our attention here to 
the types of institutions most relevant for credit intermediation. 
Source: CGFS (2010). 
 
Discussions about which instruments would be best suited to macroprudential policy are at 
an early stage (see CGFS (2010), Galati and Moessner (2011) and Moreno (2011)). A 
number of instruments could potentially be used for macroprudential purposes (Table 1). 
However, policymakers are not entirely sure about how they should be used, and there is 
much uncertainty about their effectiveness in ensuring financial stability (Blanchard (2011)). 
Nor are the possible interactions between different instruments well understood. Having 
several instruments of unproven effectiveness runs the risk of misuse.  
Many broad policy questions remain to be resolved and policy risks assessed. For example, 
is the aim of macroprudential policy to make the banks more resilient or to moderate cyclical 
movements in asset prices? Could constraints imposed under macroprudential policy run the 
risk of overregulation and protectionism (with the additional risk that this would pose to 
innovation and growth)?  
ii.  Challenges to policymaking autonomy 
A further issue is whether new powers for financial stability policy could undermine autonomy 
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independently of short-term political pressures because monetary policy objectives are 
sufficiently easy to specify; because the outcome of policy actions is readily observable 
relative to mandated objectives; and because coordination with fiscal policy is generally 
conducted at arm’s length. However, monetary policy and financial stability objectives will 
sometimes conflict. The addition of a less clearly defined macroprudential mandate, and the 
possibility of a more activist use of regulatory levers, may challenge this understanding. The 
practical difficulty of implementing macroprudential policy and of measuring success at doing 
so may lead politicians to want to exercise greater day-to-day influence over policymaking. 
Indeed, some would see the concentration of several public policy functions in one institution 
as running counter to the checks and balances of an open society. 
The central bank could also face greater lobbying from interest groups. Financial stability 
policy decisions are more likely to be seen as directly affecting particular interest groups than 
decisions on monetary policy. The financial services and real estate industries, for example, 
might lobby hard against any tightening of prudential standards. Emergency lending actions, 
in the form of sharp reductions in policy rates or emergency rescue operations, could also 
benefit certain financial actors at the expense of others.  
iii.  Potential loss of policy focus  
Another concern is that adding new policy functions could increase the risks of management 
distraction. The intellectual frameworks and the skills necessary to conduct monetary, macro- 
and microprudential policies differ substantially. In several countries, concerns about 
undermining the effectiveness and credibility of the monetary policy process have played a 
significant role in keeping the central bank narrowly focused on a price stability objective. 
Such a focus would be more difficult to preserve with the addition of a new overlapping 
mandate.  
iv.  Possible weakening of accountability 
Ensuring accountability for financial stability policy will prove particularly challenging for 
central banks. As noted above, objectives and actions cannot be specified for financial policy 
with the same degree of precision as they can for monetary policy. They may also involve 
conflict with other policy objectives. The evaluation of the central bank’s effectiveness in 
meeting such objectives will necessarily be imprecise – and this could weaken accountability.  
v.  Challenge of coordinating policy actions  
Financial stability policy has many dimensions: policy development, rule-making, supervision 
and emergency intervention. Any central bank responsibility for these dimensions will by 
necessity be shared with other government agencies. Thus, the overlapping interests of 
those agencies, and their interaction with government decision-makers, must be managed. 
Effective coordination mechanisms are particularly important for crisis management but they 
are also relevant to crisis prevention. Assigning a focal role to the central bank in 
macroprudential policy would require the creation of decision-making structures that provide 
for the internally coordinated calibration of monetary, macro- and microprudential settings. 
The central bank’s analysis and actions would have to be coordinated with those of other 
agencies.  26  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
4.  Looking for an appropriate institutional arrangement  
Several possible configurations for the assignment of policy functions among responsible 
agencies could be considered, each calling for different governance arrangements. The 
Ingves Report identified four main configurations for preventive macroprudential policy 
assignments among responsible agencies, each of which has advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to the issues identified earlier.  
i.  Macroprudential policy as a shared responsibility  
One approach is to form a macroprudential or systemic risk council to coordinate the work of 
the various agencies responsible for financial stability. This is an approach that has been 
adopted in the European Union and the United States (see Appendix Table 1, which 
summarises the arrangements adopted in selected countries). The fact that macroprudential 
policy will require both macro- and microeconomic analytical inputs, and will be implemented 
primarily through monetary and microprudential policy instruments, suggests that 
coordination of decision-making by otherwise separate and independent agencies would be 
a natural approach.  
A crucial issue is whether such a council is simply a vehicle for joint analysis and peer 
pressure or a decision-making body in its own right. In other words, the question is whether 
the agencies represented on the council retain autonomy over their sphere of interest or 
whether the council can direct policy actions by member (and even non-member) agencies.  
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which became operational in early 2011, has 
no formal directive powers.
2 It operates under a peer review approach and is allowed to issue 
recommendations or warnings to a wide range of European supervisory agencies and to 
member states directly where systemic risks are deemed to be significant. The potential 
recipients of such recommendations or warnings may be invited by the governing body of the 
ESRB to present their views before final action. The same body will decide on the extent to 
which recommendations or warnings have been followed. However, publication of 
recommendations or warnings will be subject to majority decision by the governing body of 
the ESRB.  
In the United States, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was established 
in 2010, has formal decision-making powers and can designate institutions and financial 
services providers that would require heightened prudential standards, and make binding 
recommendations to primary supervisors with respect to heightened regulatory 
requirements.
3  
ii.  Macroprudential policy as a responsibility of the central bank; separate 
microprudential regulators 
A second approach, which exists in various incarnations in Japan, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, is to delegate responsibility for macroprudential policy primarily to the central bank 
while leaving responsibility for microprudential policy to other agencies. Such an approach is 
sometimes seen as an easier option in countries where there is already an institutional 
separation between monetary and microprudential functions. It may also be adopted where 
the sharing of responsibilities among several agencies is not appealing, either because of a 
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concern that sharing could weaken focus, be a source of friction between agencies or simply 
be too cumbersome to manage.  
The relationship of the central bank with microprudential authorities will depend on what the 
central bank’s macroprudential function will entail. If it entails the central bank’s “leaning 
against the wind” in executing monetary policy, the need for interaction with microprudential 
authorities will be limited. By contrast, if it involves regulatory measures, such as determining 
a macroprudential overlay on capital or liquidity requirements, much greater interaction will 
be needed. In essence, the central bank would then become the regulator and the 
microprudential agencies would become the policy implementers. This arrangement could 
trigger inter-agency rivalry and complicate the independence of the microprudential 
regulators with respect to their spheres of responsibility. But it is by no means rare for 
microprudential regulators to implement policy settings determined by others.  
The choice of internal decision-making structures within the central bank will have important 
implications when it comes to dealing with potential conflicts and trade-offs. Where the same 
committee makes decisions on both monetary and financial stability policy, coordination 
costs will be reduced, allowing in principle for maximum synergies and more rapid reactions. 
If actions of the single decision-making body are subject to disclosure requirements, it would 
be important to clearly articulate the nature of the trade-offs and the reasons for specific 
choices in any given situation. Decision processes that are delegated to separate decision-
making boards will presumably make trade-offs more evident, since each decision-making 
group will relatively quickly identify the other as a barrier to success. Especially where each 
decision stream is subject to disclosure requirements, this would probably make the 
existence of difficult choices more obvious to the public. 
iii.  Central bank as macro- and microprudential policy agency; separate financial 
product safety regulator  
A third variant, which will be introduced in the United Kingdom, is to integrate macro- and 
microprudential policy within the central bank while maintaining a separate financial product 
safety regulator. Such a structure can be adopted on the basis of existing arrangements in 
which the central bank is already the microprudential supervisor, or it can be the result of a 
redesign of arrangements that brings microprudential supervision within the central bank. 
A major potential advantage of assembling the main financial policy functions within the 
central bank is improved access to information and expertise.
4 However, potential advantage 
and actual gain are not necessarily the same. Even if functions are brought under one roof, 
silos of responsibility within the organisation could still fragment information and analysis. 
More generally, the differing intellectual frameworks implied by the various functions could 
inhibit communication. It would seem from experience that systemic analysis is less natural 
to the analysts typically employed in microprudential supervision (who tend to focus on 
balance sheet and institutional risk analysis). The limited attention given to financial factors in 
formal macroeconomic models also speaks to the large gaps between the training of 
macroeconomic and macroprudential analysts. Moreover, crossing divisional boundaries is 
not easy and may indeed be inappropriate in some instances (eg with respect to commercial 
secrets, yet-to-be-announced policy actions, etc). Whether these gaps can be bridged, and 
silos avoided, by bringing these functions together under forceful management is an open 
question.  
                                                  
4   Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke has stressed the value of the Federal Reserve’s supervisory 
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In the new arrangement considered for the United Kingdom, the various policy functions will 
be clearly separated. Microprudential oversight will be brought back to the central bank in the 
form of an operationally independent subsidiary of the Bank of England, the Prudential 
Regulation Authority. Macroprudental oversight will be under the responsibility of the 
Financial Policy Committee, which will be a subcommittee of the Court of Directors but will 
function along lines similar to those of the existing Monetary Policy Committee.
5 The 
legislation will also devolve responsibility for the regulation of business practices across the 
entire spectrum of financial services to a new specialist regulator, the Financial Conduct 
Authority. Coordination of the analysis and decisions of the dedicated decision-making 
bodies will be ensured in part by cross-membership of the top officials represented in the 
committees and authorities. However, given the diversity of organisational structures adopted 
for each main policy function, other mechanisms will be introduced to ensure a smooth 
interaction between them (see HM Treasury (2011)).  
The prospective UK approach has already been largely adopted in France. Reforms 
introduced last year consolidate several regulators into an autonomous super-regulator, the 
Prudential Supervisory Authority (PSA), which is located within the Bank of France, is 
chaired by the Governor of the central bank and has an explicit mandate for financial 
stability. Measures were also taken to improve consumer protection under the Financial 
Markets Authority, which will remain independent but will work in close cooperation with the 
PSA.  
iv.  Separate macroprudential agency with distributed implementation  
The last approach involves the creation of a specialist agency for the macroprudential 
function. A separate agency would probably have advantages over a shared responsibility 
model with respect to clear dedication to macroprudential issues, coordination and speed of 
action. However, it would raise questions with respect to implementation since the policy 
instruments used to implement macroprudential policy are usually assigned to other policy 
obectives or are under the control of other agencies. It would also raise issues with respect 
to the autonomy of the other agencies, as is the case with arrangements involving 
macroprudential councils. While it is conceivable that such an agency could be given 
authority to require action by microprudential supervisors, it would probably be less sensible 
to give it authority (even if partial) over interest rate settings. Interestingly, only one of the 
reform proposals identified by the Ingves Report considered the creation of a truly separate 
agency, but this proposal did not materialise in any final legislation.
6  
5.  How is this relevant to Africa? 
Before African central banks can contemplate more active involvement in financial stability, 
the value of reforming existing arrangements has to be carefully considered. As the previous 
discussion illustrated, reforming financial stability arrangements raises a complex set of 
issues, and a “one size fits all” approach is unlikely to be of much practical use.  
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i.  Level of development of financial systems 
One consideration is the level of development of African financial systems. Macroprudential 
policy analysis focuses on externalities – systemic risks arising from common exposures and 
interlinkages among financial institutions and markets. Leverage can magnify such risks 
(Caruana (2010)).  
In Africa, informal financial channels play an important role (see the paper by Hawkins in this 
volume). The small scale, simplicity and lack of leverage in such mechanisms may limit 
systemic risks. But financial markets that are thin or comparatively underdeveloped still pose 
risks. Most financial systems in Africa tend to be dominated by a limited number of banks; 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) remain small; and markets for securities and interbank 
claims are in their infancy (see Quintyn and Taylor (2007) and Beck et al (forthcoming)). The 
risks of market participants trying to move in the same direction at the same time (herding) 
may be greater when markets are dominated by a few similar institutions. Market volatility is 
typically higher and financial assets are less reliable as collateral. The risks of market 
manipulation are also higher.
7  
In a number of higher-income African countries, NBFIs and financal markets are growing 
rapidly. They are also becoming more international. The past couple of decades have seen 
growing penetration of domestic banking markets by international banking groups and the 
emergence of a number of pan-African banking groups, which would increase the potential 
for cross-border financial contagion. As countries in Africa become more financially 
advanced, their financial stability considerations will become more like those in the industrial 
economies, and the governance-related issues discussed earlier in the context of European 
and North American countries will acquire greater relevance.  
ii.  Quality of supervisory arrangements  
According to the assessment in Beck et al (forthcoming), most banking systems in Africa are 
stable and well capitalised thanks to banking sector reform and regulation. However, they 
also note that better rule-making has not been accompanied by a corresponding 
improvement in the quality of banking sector oversight. According to them, supervisory 
resources, including qualified staff and availability of analytical tools, are limited in most 
African countries. Many regulators are not independent of the Ministry of Finance or other 
government agencies, and legal frameworks often limit the corrective and remedial powers of 
supervisors to intervene in failing banks. Critically, supervisory processes focus on 
compliance with regulatory standards but are not set up to identify and manage the changing 
risks in the financial system. In addition, the ability to monitor risks on the institutional and 
systemic level is hampered by insufficient data and reporting processes. They emphasise 
that an upgrade of supervisory arrangements along the lines of Basel II would entail, both for 
banks and for regulators, human resource and infrastructure costs that would be beyond the 
means of many countries in Africa. They conclude that without a significant strengthening of 
supervisory capacity, the implementation of more complex supervisory arrangements would 
be built on shaky ground and would not provide an adequate framework to enhance financial 
stability.  
                                                  




Governance indicators for selected regions 
Y-axis represents average score for each region 



















































Note: The World Governance Indicators comprise six measures of the quality of governance in more than 
200 countries. Four of the measures are shown here. 
1  Africa.    
2  East and South Asia.    
3  Latin America.    
4  Middle East. 
Source: Brookings Institution, World Bank Institute, and Development Research Group of the World Bank. 
Given this analysis, a first step would be to concentrate on the foundations of sound banking 
supervision rather than on developing more complex oversight schemes. Yet, as Barth et al 
(2006) note, the right institutional environment is an essential precondition for a 
strengthening of bank supervision.
8 The quality of governance arrangements seems to be of 
relevance to Africa given the readings provided by well known governance indicators (see 
Graph 2).  
If supervisory agencies have substantial influence over bank business and strategies, 
elected officials and supervisors may try to abuse that influence to force banks to divert the 
flow of credit to satisfy private rather broader interests. If they do, strengthening official 
oversight of banks without establishing proper governance arrangements might in fact 
reduce banking sector efficiency and stability. Barth et al (2006) note that an important step 
in promoting sound banking would be to introduce measures aimed at improving the ability of 
the private sector to monitor banks. The disclosure of reliable, comprehensive and timely 
                                                  
8   In an empirical analysis of the relationship between governance, financial liberalisation and development in 
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information on banks’ operations, along the lines of Basel II’s Pillar 3 on market discipline, 
would help. The authors also urge strengthening the rights of private investors.  
iii.  Political economy  
Another set of challenges will be faced by central banks that feel ready to develop a 
macroprudential framework. As noted above, the implementation of a macroprudential 
function could lead to a more activist use of policy tools, but their use by several distinct 
agencies could lead to coordination problems. Another challenge is that, rather than 
correcting inappropriate macroeconomic policies, governments may instead pressure the 
relevant authorities to use macro- and microprudential tools. This could open the door to 
arbitrary policy decisions, particularly in countries where transparency in policymaking is 
limited. It could even encourage rent-seeking behaviour in countries where the rule of law is 
not firmly established.  
In countries where central bank autonomy is not yet well established, the introduction of a 
new financial stability mandate could create an additional pretext for political interference. 
This could threaten monetary policy autonomy. As is the case for banking supervision, it 
might be preferable to introduce solid governance arrangements for the central bank before 
trying to introduce more complex policymaking into the central bank’s mandate.  
iv.   Monetary policy frameworks 
Another element that could complicate the design of a macroprudential policy framework is 
the evolving environment within which monetary policy is conducted. A few countries have 
moved from exchange rate or monetary targeting to various forms of inflation targeting (see 
the paper by Vibe Christensen in this volume) and a number of countries are now 
considering moving in this direction. Such a transition involves an intricate set of governance, 
policy and technical issues. Introducing a macroprudential policy framework in such an 
evolving environment will inevitably be a challenging task.  
6. What  arrangements  would be suitable?  
On balance, the relatively simple and bank-centred nature of African financial systems and 
the shortage of qualified personnel would argue for the central bank playing an important role 
in maintaining financial stability. Often the central bank is one of the few institutions that have 
sufficient resources to attract employees with the type of skills required for working in 
macroeconomic analysis and banking supervision.  
In a review of five stylised models of banking supervision in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
Quintyn and Taylor (2007) found that two of the models were best suited to the 
circumstances of the sub-continent.
9 In one, a unified supervisory entity is linked to the 
central bank (in terms of infrastructure and logistics) but has a separate governance 
structure. In the other, supervision of deposit-taking institutions is housed in the central bank, 
and supervision of all NBFIs is housed in a separate agency. The authors argued that both 
models would preserve an important supervisory role for the central bank, which they 
deemed important given local circumstances.  
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There would be advantages to integrating the macro- and microprudential functions within 
the central bank, either with separate or unified internal decision-making structures. Such an 
integrated model would keep the most systemically important activities within the central 
bank, minimise regulatory gaps, allow for a more efficient coordination of policy functions, 
help ward off external pressure to engage in directed lending or forbearance, and take 
advantage of the central bank’s physical and human resource infrastructure while allowing 
for an internal deployment of skilled staff.  
But it could be argued that giving greater policymaking power to the central bank could lead 
to a greater risk of monolithic thinking (groupthink) and therefore to a greater risk of policy 
errors and public criticism. The adoption of one of the two supervision models just discussed 
would therefore need to be accompanied by some strengthening of the formal accountability 
mechanisms for the central bank. Disclosure of financial stability decisions and actions, and 
the reasons for them, would be essential – although some delay might be necessary if 
immediate disclosure risked triggering instability.  
In view of the strong presence of international banking groups in many countries and the 
expanding web of intraregional banking relationships, particular thought would have to be 
given to coordination with outside regulators. Regional coordination is already being 
strengthened in the Central African and West African currency areas, with, for example, the 
recent establishment of a Comité de Stabilité Financière in the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union and discussions concerning the creation of a Forum de Stabilité Financière 
in the Economic Community of Central African States.  
7. Concluding  comments   
The recent global financial crisis raised important questions about what the exact role of 
central banks should be in the area of financial stability. In a number of countries, new 
arrangements that attempt to deal with identified weaknesses are being introduced. The 
macroprudential dimension to supervision is also relevant to the rudimentary financial 
systems of many African countries given that thin financial markets dominated by a small 
number of banks also create systemic issues.  
As African financial systems grow in complexity, countries in the region will face the same 
issues that have prompted a review of financial stability arrangements in other parts of the 
world. This could lead to calls for a reconfiguration of such arrangements, with the possibility 
of a stronger involvement of central banks in macroprudential oversight.  
Stronger central bank involvement in this area could raise delicate issues of governance. 
Aside from the difficulties of specifying a mandate for financial stability and obtaining the 
tools necessary to implement it, central banks could face challenges to their decision-making 
arrangements and policymaking autonomy. Before central banks can contemplate a more 
active involvement in the area of financial stability, the net value of reforming existing 























Appendix Table 1 
Selection of recently established inter-agency financial stability councils 





Risk Board (ESRB) 
Became operational 
in January 2011 
 
Number of members: 33 voting, 
28 non-voting (General Board) 
Chair: President of European 
Central Bank (ECB, for next 
5 years) - must be a member of 
the ECB’s General Council 
Other voting members: 
Governors of European System 
of Central Banks member banks 
(27), VP of ECB, member of 
European Commission, Chairs of 
European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs, 3) 
Non-voting members: 
President of Economic and 
Financial Committee, high level 
representatives of EU member 
state supervisory authorities (27) 
Development of a macro-
prudential framework 
Identification of systemic risks 
issuance of recommendations for 
action and warnings 
Powers to require information from member 
agencies but no formal directive powers.  
Based on a peer review approach.  
Allowed to issue recommendations and warnings 
to ESAs, member states, individual member 
state agencies, or Europe wide, on an act-or-
explain basis  
Addressees of recommendations and warnings 
may be invited to present their views before the 
adoption of recommendations and warnings 
However, publication of such recommendations 
and warnings is subject to majority voting of 
General Board  
Reporting to EU Parliament and ECOFIN Council 
France  Financial Regulation 
and Systemic Risk 
Council (FRSRC) 
To be established 
 
Number of members: 5  
Chair: Minister for Finance (or 
his representative) 
Other members: Governor of 
the Banque de France (as 
President of the Prudential 
Supervisory Authority (PSA), 
Vice-President of the PSA), 
President of the Financial 
Markets Authority (or their 
representative), President of the 
Accounting Standards Authority  
Foster cooperation and 
information exchange  
Consider French 
market/institution developments 
from a macro-prudential 
perspective  
Taking account of ESRB 
recommendations  
Coordinate with European/ 
international initiatives 
Will be able to issue opinions and position 
statements with respect to European and 























Selection of recently established inter-agency financial stability councils (cont) 
Country/region  Name of council  Membership   Mandate (s)  Main powers  





Number of members:  8 to 9 
voting members 
Chair: Minister for Finance 
Other members: Governor of 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
Finance Secretary and/or 
Secretary of Department of 
Economic Affairs 
Secretary of Department of 
Financial Services 
Chief Economic Advisor of 
Ministry of Finance 
Chairman of Securities and 
Exchange Board of India 
Chairman of Insurance 
Regulatory and Development 
Authority 
Chairman of Pension Fund 
Regulatory and Development 
Authority 
A sub-committee headed by the 
Governor of the RBI will replace 
the existing High Level 
Coordination Committee on 
Financial markets 
Strengthen the mechanism for 
maintaining financial stability, 
financial sector development, 
and inter-regulatory coordination  
The council will be responsible 
for dealing with issues relating to:  
Financial stability 
Financial sector development 
Inter-regulatory coordination 
Financial literacy and inclusion  
Macroprudential supervision, 
including the functioning of large 
financial conglomerates 
Coordinating India’s interface 
with international financial bodies 























Selection of recently established inter-agency financial stability councils (cont) 
Country/region  Name of council  Membership   Mandate (s)  Main powers  




in October 2010 
Total number of members: 10 
voting, 5 non-voting 
Chair:  Secretary of the Treasury 
Other voting members: 
Chairman of Federal Reserve, 
Comptroller of Currency, Director 
of Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, Chair of Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 
Chair of FDIC, Chair of CFTC, 
Director of Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, Chair of 
National Credit Union 
Administration Board, an 
independent member (with 
insurance expertise) 
Non-voting advisory members: 
Director of Office of Financial 
Research, Director of Federal 
Insurance Office, a state 
insurance commissioner, a state 
banking supervisor, a state 
securities commissioner 
Identify financial risks 
Promote market discipline by 
eliminating expectations of 
government support  
Respond to emerging threats 
Designate institutions and financial service 
providers as requiring heightened regulatory 
standards by the Federal Reserve  
Make recommendations to primary supervisors, 
including member agencies, with respect to 
heightened regulatory requirements; such 
recommendations requiring implementation, or 
explanation as to why not 
Call for information from members agencies or 
other agencies or direct from companies 
Advise Congress 
Annual report to Congress; Chair will testify on 
behalf of the Council. Each voting member will 
be required to affirm that the federal government 
is taking all reasonable steps to assure financial 
stability, or describe steps necessary. Reporting 
to Congress on particular topics, as appropriate  
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